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ABSTRACT 
 
We present series of the shares of income accruing to the top groups of the distribution in Colombia between 
1993 and 2010, based on individual income tax data. We obtain four main empirical results. First, income in 
Colombia is highly concentrated, the top 1% of the income distribution accounting for over 20% of total 
income in 2010. This is at the highest level of inequality in any recent year in the entire WTID sample. Second, 
high-income individuals in Colombia are, in essence, rentiers and capital owners. Third, while households’ 
surveys show that inequality has been decreasing since 2006, tax-based results offer a different picture, where 
concentration at the top has remained stable; when survey based Gini coefficients are adjusted to take into 
account higher incomes reported to tax files, inequality levels are higher, and the recent reduction in inequality 
is less pronounced. Fourth, income taxation does little to reduce the high levels of inequality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been much recent interest in falling income inequality in Latin America over the past decade. 
Scholars have been trying to understand such decline in a region historically characterised by high, persistent 
inequality (Lustig and López Calva, 2010). However, little has been said about the very top of the distribution. 
To the extent that the overwhelming majority of the literature uses households survey data, which 
underestimate income concentration, a reassessment of the evolution of income distribution is in order. In this 
paper we study the shares of top incomes in Colombia between 1993 and 2010 using tax data. The case of 
Colombia is worth studying on several grounds.  
 
First, Colombia is the first country in Latin America to provide micro-data from the personal income tax for a 
relatively long period of time (1993-2010).2 These data allow for a detailed analysis of high incomes, including 
the years for which surveys indicate a decline in inequality. They also provide the necessary information to 
accurately determine the average tax rates effectively paid by top income recipients. This is a first-order 
concern in a continent marked by regressive tax systems. 
 
Second, Colombia has traditionally been identified as having one of the highest Gini coefficients in Latin 
America (Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008). In the beginning of the 1990s, the country embarked on a process of 
market liberalization in the context of the Washington Consensus, and experienced positive growth until 1994. 
Between 1994 and 2003, it plunged into the most severe economic recession in the last century, the income 
per adult dropping by 13% (see Figure 1). This was followed by an economic boom in the mid-2000s that was 
only temporarily interrupted by the global economic crisis in 2008–2009. Hence, it is important to re-assess 
the link between growth and distribution. 
 
Third, Colombia has undergone key changes in the political arena since the 1990s. The 1991 constitution 
established progressiveness as the foundation of the tax system (article 363). As a result, all the subsequent tax 
reforms have been presented as serving such principle. This study can shed some light on the extent to which 
these well-intentioned political efforts actually translated into real impacts on the distribution through the tax 
system. 
 
The use of tax statistics is not without drawbacks. First, since only a fraction of the population files a tax 
return, studies using tax data are restricted to measuring top shares, which are silent about changes in the 
lower and middle part of the distribution. Second, estimates may be biased due to tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. These elements, which are common to all countries, become critical in the developing 
world. In Colombia, until recently plagued by high insecurity, the rich and wealthy may be particularly 
dissuaded from disclosing their fortunes and incomes to authorities, lest the information revealed fall 
into the wrong hands. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that, during the intense political violence of the 
1990s, leaked personal tax returns were used by criminal groups to target victims and kidnap for ransom. 
                                                
2 There are few studies on the evolution of income inequality in Colombia from a historical perspective; Londoño (1995) is an 
exception, as well as Londoño Vélez’ master thesis (2012), which started the work with the databases used in this paper. 
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This study obtains four main empirical results. First, income in Colombia is highly concentrated, as the top 
1% of the income distribution accounts for 20.4% of total gross income in 2010. Top income shares are at the 
highest level in any recent year in the entire WTID sample, except for the US, which has overtaken Colombia 
for several years in the late 1990s and the 2000s. The net-of-tax top 1% share is 20.1% in 2010, which can be 
compared with the figure from the household survey: 13.5%.  
 
Second, high-income individuals in Colombia are, in essence, rentiers and capital owners. This feature differs 
from the pattern found in several developed countries in recent decades, where it has been shown that the 
large increase in the share of income going to the top groups has been mainly due to spectacular increases in 
executive compensation and high salaries, and to a lesser extent to a partial restoration of capital incomes. 
While the working rich have joined capital owners at the top of the income hierarchy in the United States and 
other English-speaking countries, Colombia remains a more traditional society where the top income 
recipients are still the owners of the capital stock. 
 
Third, while households’ surveys show that inequality measured by the Gini coefficient went down when 2006 
and 2010 are compared, tax-based results offer a different picture, in which concentration at the top has 
remained stable over the same period. When survey based Gini coefficients are adjusted to take into account 
top incomes reported in tax files, inequality levels are higher than previously measured, and the recent 
reduction in inequality is less pronounced. 
 
FIGURE 1
Average Real Income and Consumer Price Index in Colombia, 1990-2010
Source: Table A1.
Notes: Figure reports the average real income per adult (aged 20 and above), expressed in real 2010 thousand Colombian Pesos.
CPI index is equal to 100 in 2010.
1 USD ≈ 2,000 Colombian Pesos (2010 prices)
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Fourth, personal taxation does little to reduce inequality. The income tax burden is very low at the upper end 
of the income distribution, due to a multiplicity of legal tax reliefs, even without considering the effects of 
evasion. 
 
These results are not a novelty from the qualitative point of view, in the light of the well-known high 
inequality levels and distortive tax systems in Latin America. However, they challenge the general scepticism 
regarding the use of tax data from developing countries to study inequality. Our estimates should be regarded 
as a lower bound, to take into account the effects of evasion and under reporting. Nevertheless, they show 
that incomes reported to tax authorities can be a valuable source of information, under certain conditions that 
require a case-by-case analysis. In Colombia, the average income tax rate effectively paid by the top 1% (7-8%) 
is so modest by OECD standards that the incentives to hide income could be much more limited than 
previously thought. The supportive evidence is given by the estimated levels of top shares. Our results also 
indicate that when high incomes are properly taken into account, optimism about declining inequality in Latin 
America should be somewhat dampened. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 
presents the findings on top income shares. Section 4 discusses the comparison with households’ survey-
based inequality estimates. Section 5 describes the main features of the personal income tax in Colombia, and 
analyses the outcomes of the taxation of top incomes. Section 6 concludes. Details about the data sources, 
methods, computations and adjustments are presented in the appendix. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODS 
 
To our knowledge, there have been no official publications providing personal income tax statistics (as the 
ones used in this paper) over the last three decades in Colombia. Our basic raw data sources are two panels of 
micro-data and a set of tabulations compiled especially for us by the DIAN, the Colombian tax administration. 
They cover, with varying degree of detail, the years from 1993 to 2010. In particular,  
a. Balanced panel of micro-data 2006-2010, with information from all the boxes of the tax file for those 
individuals who filed a return every year between 2006 and 2010 (60-70% of the universe of tax 
returns). 
b. Unbalanced panel of micro-data 1993-2006, with information from the most relevant boxes of the tax 
files for the universe of tax filers. 
c. Tabulations, from 1992 to 2010, based on the universe of tax filers, and which report, by ranges of 
gross income, the total number of tax filers in each bracket and key variables of the tax returns. 
 
They constitute a rich and unique data source, including information on wages and self-employment income, 
rents, business income and capital income allowances, deductions, and taxes. The fact that the 2006–2010 
micro-data (source a) is a balanced panel poses an empirical challenge due to non-random attrition. To 
overcome this issue, we combine the panel and the tabulations as explained in more detail in the appendix. 
i Population control 
There are several methodological problems when estimating top income shares from tax records. A more or 
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less standard methodology has been established, combining tax data with external sources for the reference 
population and total income (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010). 
 
Concerning the population control, there is the need to relate the number of individuals to a control total to 
define how many tax filers represent a given fractile, such as the top percentile. The Colombian income tax is 
based on the individual; consequently, the number of tax units (i.e. the number of individuals had everyone 
been required to file) is approximated by the adult population defined as all residents aged 20 years old and 
above. 
 
Due to high informality rates and the high filing thresholds, the number of tax filers is rather low. On average, 
only 2.5% of adults were required to file an income tax return in 1993–2010. In this respect, two issues are 
worth mentioning. First, the number of tax assessments has doubled, from around 2% of adults in 1993, to 
4% in 2010, thanks to the rapid growth of incomes since the mid-2000s and, most importantly, to the 
reduction in thresholds established by the 2003 reform. Second, the total number of income-taxpayers is 
higher than the number of tax filers, because most taxpayers (e.g. those receiving only wages and self-
employment income below the reporting thresholds) are not allowed to file a return, but are anyway subject to 
the tax withheld at the source.3 Unfortunately, the available statistics (both microdata and tabulations) exclude 
those who pay but do not file, and there even seems to be no precise information about the total number of 
taxpayers. The DIAN estimates that around 5 million individuals (18% of adults) were subject to the income 
tax in 2010, out of which 1.1 million (4% of adults) filed a tax return (see Table A1 in appendix). 
 
A large initial exempted bracket. One of the noteworthy features of the Colombian personal income tax is the 
large initial bracket that goes untaxed (in 2010, taxable income under $26,764,951 pesos or PPP US$ 20,341). 
For wage earners that benefit only from the standard minimum tax reliefs (mandatory pension and healthcare 
contributions, and 25% of wages), this means that those earning up to 2010 $39,799,182 pesos gross (PPP 
US$30,247) do not pay the tax. This threshold is 3.5 times the mean income per adult, and corresponds to the 
tiny minority of taxpayers who do not make recourse to any of many additional tax reliefs. It is the highest in 
Latin America, representing three times the regional average. Most importantly, it excludes 92% of wage 
earners (Avila and Cruz 2011) from contributing to the tax. 
ii Income control 
A second issue concerns the control total for income. We approximate the total income control as the sum of 
households’ primary incomes and social benefits other than in-kind social transfers, but net of (1) employers’ 
actual social contributions, (2) imputed social contributions, (3) imputed property income of insurance 
policyholders, (4) imputed rentals for owner occupied housing, and (5) fixed capital consumption (set at 5% 
of gross values). This procedure generates a reference gross income of about 65% of GDP, which is similar to 
other studies in Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010). The results are presented in Table A1 in appendix. 
iii The definition of income 
In the case of Colombia, further complications arise when defining individuals’ incomes from the information 
reported to tax assessments. At this stage it is necessary to point out that the tax-file definition of ‘gross 
                                                
3 This fact does not affect our estimates because those taxpayers who are not allowed to file an income tax return do not belong 
to the top 1% group. 
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income’ includes costs incurred to obtain it, which we would like to subtract to reach our preferred definition. 
Unfortunately the tax file does not provide strict information of such expenses; the relevant variable, ‘costs 
and deductions,’ includes a variety of items, many of which seem to be exaggeratedly used to legally reduce the 
tax liability, instead of reflecting real costs. Salaries and fees paid for services, office space rental costs, medical 
and education expenses, taxes, financial fees, interest, are therein reported jointly with donations, expenses 
incurred abroad, investments, etc. Additionally, in many cases, self-employees are allowed to deduct between 
50% and 90% of their gross income as costs without further justification. 
 
Consequently, as an ad hoc correction, we have defined our 
 
income = ‘gross income (as in the tax form)’ minus 1/6 of ‘costs and deductions.’ 
 
This definition probably underestimates the true income derived from wages and salaries, because workers 
have much more limited access to legal deductions, and overestimate the true income derived from some 
other activities. In any case, taking gross incomes (as defined in the tax form) without consideration of any 
costs and deductions would increase our estimates of the top 1% income share by some 2 percentage points 
(not 2%) on average. This means that, in 2010, the figure would go up from 20.4% to 22.1%.4 
 
Two additional clarifications are in order. First, this definition of income includes all income items reported in 
the personal tax returns (wages and salaries, self-employment, rents and capital income, (among which interest 
and dividends), unincorporated business income, and irregular income (long term capital gains, inheritances, 
donations)), and it is before personal income taxes and employee payroll taxes but after employers’ payroll 
taxes and corporate income taxes. Second, gross business income for taxpayers involved in retail and other 
commercial activities, and who are required to keep accountancy books, has been defined as gross revenue, 
minus refunds, rebates and discounts on sales, minus sales costs, minus administrative operational expenses, 
minus operational sales expenses.5 
                                                
4 Note that, in subtracting one-sixth of ‘costs and deductions’ (specifically, ‘other costs and deductions’ in tax form 2010 and 
‘other deductions’ in tax form 110) in our definition of income, we are assuming that only this portion represents costs incurred. 
We examine the sensitivity of our results in Table A11 in appendix. 
5 Up to 2003 there was only one tax form. Since 2004 personal income statements have been separated into tax form 110, for 
filers required to keep accountancy books (e.g. shopkeepers and other individuals whose main activity is related to retail and other 
commercial ventures), and tax form 210, for filers not required to keep accountancy books (e.g. wage earners, self-employees, 
capital income recipients). 
 
 (pesos '000s)
US$ (market 
exchange 
rate) US$ (PPP)  (pesos '000s)
US$ (market 
exchange 
rate) US$ (PPP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Population 28.104.576 $12.042 $6.021 $9.152
P99 $101.293 $50.647 $76.982 Top 1-0.5% 140.523 $126.403 $63.202 $96.066
P99.5 $160.930 $80.465 $122.305 Top 0.5-0.1% 112.418 $235.831 $117.915 $179.229
P99.9 $404.750 $202.375 $307.607 Top 0.1-0.05% 14.052 $482.015 $241.008 $366.328
P99.95 $590.534 $295.267 $448.801 Top 0.05-0.01% 11.242 $818.529 $409.264 $622.075
P99.99 $1.343.255 $671.627 $1.020.863 Top 0.01%-0.001% 2.529 $2.137.123 $1.068.562 $1.624.197
P99.999 $4.792.947 $2.396.474 $3.642.602 Top 0.001% 281 $12.616.031 $6.308.015 $9.588.084
Note: In 2010, US$1 = $2000 pesos market exchange rate, and PPP US$1 = $1,316 pesos 
Thresholds
Income threshold
Table 1. Thresholds and average incomes in top groups within the top percentile, Colombia 2010
Average income
Income Groups Number of tax units
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3. TOP INCOME SHARES 
i Preview of magnitudes 
To get a sense of the orders of magnitude, we report in Table 1 the thresholds and the average incomes in 
each fractile in 2010. There were 28.1 million adults, and mean income was COP (Colombian Pesos) 12 
million (PPP US$ 9,152). To belong to the top 1% (P99), an income of at least COP 101 million (PPP 
US$ 76,982) was required. The average income of the top 0.001% group was COP 12.6 billion pesos (PPP 
US$ 9.6 million). 
 
In order to put these numbers in global perspective, Figure 2 shows incomes at different percentiles in 
Colombia, Spain and the US in PPP US$ in 2010. Colombia’s P99.9 is close to but lower than the P99 in the 
US; Colombia’s P99.99 is about one tenth of the US counterpart. Interestingly, top percentiles in Colombia 
are comparable to those in Spain (which could be taken as a European average), despite the fact that the 
average income is one-half. In fact, the higher one climbs in the ladder, the closer incomes in Colombia are 
to those in Spain.  
 
Incomes at different percentiles in Colombia, Spain and US in PPP US Dollars in 2010
Notes: Estimates for Spain and US include capital gains.
Sources: The World Top Incomes Database and authors' estimates.
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ii Trends in top income shares 
 
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the income share accruing to the top 1% in Colombia from 1993 to 2010. 
The top percentile accounted for 20.5% of total income in 1993, placing Colombia at one of the highest levels 
of income concentration in the WTID. Concentration fell modestly for the rest of the decade, reaching 17.3% 
in 2000. The income share of the top percentile recovered since 2004, and income concentration has been 
persistently on the rise. In 2010, the top percentile accounted for 20.4% of total income, regaining the same 
level of 1993. To put it bluntly, despite years of strong economic growth, income in Colombia is as unequally 
distributed in 2010 as back in the early 1990s. 
 
Figure 4 decomposes the top percentile into three sub-groups: the top 1–0.5%, the top 0.5–0.1%, and the top 
0.1%. The top 1–0.5% and top 0.5–0.1% groups present a similar pattern with modest fluctuations: income 
shares increased in 1993–1996, dropped during the recession years of 1996–2001, recovered in 2002–2003, 
and since then have remained relatively stable. The income share of the top 0.1% was negatively affected 
throughout the period of 1993–2003, falling from over 8% to 6%. Partial recovery was achieved only until the 
FIGURE 3
Top 1% income share in Colombia, 1993-2010
Source: Table A4.
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mid-2000s, just before the outburst of the global financial crisis in 2007. The average income of the top 0.1% 
of the income distribution was about 85 times larger than the average income of the entire population in 1993. 
The difference fell to less than 60 times in the early 2000s, but has risen again to 75–80 times in recent years. 
 
To cast further light on what has been happening at the very top of the distribution, Figure 5 decomposes the 
top 0.1% into three sub-groups: the top 0.1–0.05%, the top 0.05–0.01%, and the top 0.01%. The low-growth 
1990s and the following crisis years did not translate into a significant income share loss for the richest 
individuals: the top 0.01 % accounted for roughly 1.5–2% of total income in 1993–2003. The high-growth 
period of the mid-2000s benefited the ultra-rich disproportionately, as the top 0.01% share doubled from 1.5 
to 3% in 2003–2006. Only did the recent financial crisis harm the ultra-rich. 
 
FIGURE 4
Top income shares in Colombia, 1993-2010
Source: Table A4.
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iii The composition of incomes in top groups 
Table 2 decomposes sub-groups within the top percentile into occupations, as registered by tax filers in the 
income tax return in 2010. Half the individuals in the top 1–0.5% report themselves as employees or self-
employees, while less than one-tenth report themselves as capital owners. This pattern is reversed for the 
richest individuals: almost 60% of the top 0.001% are capital owners and less than 12% are employees or self-
employees. The classification is somewhat fuzzy, but illustrates the importance of dividing the top percentile 
into smaller fractiles in our analysis of top incomes: even small groups as the top 1% (280 thousand 
individuals) can be very heterogeneous regarding the composition of income. This is a key feature to take into 
account when designing economic policy, given that earnings and capital incomes follow different rules. 
 
Figure 6 displays the composition of income across top groups for 2010. The income of the bottom half of 
the top percentile (top 1-0.5%), can be decomposed into wages (45.1%), self-employment income (17.0%), 
rents and other capital income (30.3%), business income (5.5%) and irregular income (2.1%). As has been 
suggested, the composition of income varies substantially with incomes within the top percentile. The share of 
wages drops with rank, constituting only 1.2% of the income of the top 0.001% group. Self-employment 
income also falls with rank, representing only 2.6% of total income of the top 0.001% group. In contrast, 
rents and other capital income make up the largest share of the very top of the distribution.  
FIGURE 5
Top income shares in Colombia, 1993-2010
Source: Table A4.
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Fractiles Employees Capital owners Real Estate Construction Other
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P99-99.5 48,13 9,71 9,94 1,39 30,83
P99.5-99.9 39,90 10,49 9,26 1,60 38,75
P99.9-99.95 26,68 14,63 9,12 2,44 47,13
P99.95-99.99 19,72 20,60 8,77 2,72 48,19
P99.99-99.999 14,45 33,00 8,32 2,65 41,58
P99.999-100 11,42 57,09 4,33 3,15 24,02
Table 2. Shares of each occupation within the top 1% in 2010
Notes: These figures are based on the balanced panel (a). The classification used here corresponds to the
occupation registered by tax filers in the income tax return, following DIAN directives. “Employees” include
both wage earners and self-employed workers.
Sources: Author’s calculation using tax returns data.
FIGURE 6
Composition of top incomes by source in Colombia, 2010
Source:(Table(A6.
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Consequently, very high-income individuals in Colombia are, in essence, rentiers; most of their income comes 
in form of returns to capital and rents. This feature differs from the pattern found in several developed 
countries in recent decades, where it has been shown that the large increase in the share of income going to 
the top groups has been mainly due to spectacular increases in executive compensation and high salaries, and 
to a lesser extent to a partial restoration of capital incomes. While the working rich have joined capital owners 
at the top of the income hierarchy in the United States and other English-speaking countries, Colombia 
remains a more traditional society where the top income recipients are still the owners of the capital stock. 
iv International comparisons 
How do income disparities in Colombia fare compared to other countries? Figure 7 contrasts the income 
share of the top 1% in Colombia with those of Argentina, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. 
Income concentration in Colombia is ostensibly high. Specifically, in 2010, the income share of the top 
percentile is twice as large in Colombia as in Japan or Spain, and three times as large as in Sweden. Moreover, 
it is higher in Colombia than in Argentina, the only other Latin American country for which estimates are 
available at the time of writing this paper. Colombia is at the highest level in any recent year in the entire 
WTID sample, except for the United States, which has overtaken Colombia for several years in the late 1990s 
and the 2000s, when taking into account capital gains, as illustrated in Figure 8.  
FIGURE 7
Top 1%  income shares in Colombia, Argentina, Japan, Spain, Sweden and US, 1993-2011
Notes: Estimates for Japan, Spain, Sweden and US include capital gains.
Sources: The World Top Incomes Database and authors' estimates.
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v Caveats 
 
In estimating top incomes, a series of caveats are in order. First, the prevalence of tax evasion certainly affects 
the levels of our estimates. Changes in tax evasion over time can hamper our analysis of the evolution of 
income concentration. Indeed, it is precisely for these reasons that economists are often skeptic towards using 
tax data to construct top income share series. In a developing country such as Colombia, these doubts appear 
justified. However, there are a number of reasons that reduce the effects of such problems. First, in our 
period of study, Colombia did not either experience sizeable tax cuts or legal changes in the definition of 
allowances and deductions that could have triggered evident behavioral responses affecting the reporting of 
incomes. Rather, the changes in the top marginal tax rate have been moderate, and thus the incentive of the 
top groups to evade the income tax may have remained fairly constant over time. Interestingly, the greatest 
rise in top incomes, occurring in 2003–2006, coincides with the period where the top marginal tax rate peaked. 
Thus, the dynamics of top income shares in the 2000s seems to reflect real economic changes. We do find 
evidence of bunching at the first kink point where tax liability starts and the marginal tax rate jumps from 0% 
to 19% (see Appendix D for a discussion). 
FIGURE 8
Top 1%  income share in Colombia and the United States, 1993-2010
Sources: The World Top Incomes Database and authors' estimates.
Notes: Series for Colombia include capital gains partially.
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Second, top shares in 2010 may be affected by a policy change that took place that year. The Santos 
administration’s Law 1429/2010 awarded preferential corporate income tax rates to newly-created firms under 
the Sociedad por Acción Simplificada (SAS) regime. In doing so, the policy may have distorted tax-filing incentives, 
triggering a behavioral response from tax filers. Seeking to take advantage of this newly-created difference 
between the personal and corporate tax rates, some high-income recipients may have resorted to shifting their 
income from the personal to the corporate tax base. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals have 
created ‘fictitious’, one-person firms under the simplified corporate regime, to reduce their tax liabilities.6 This 
implies that reported personal income would decline, while actual personal income may not be affected. From 
a policy perspective, this issue stresses the need to reinterpret both the efficiency and distributional 
consequences of such a change in the tax structure (Gordon and Slemrod 2000). From an empirical point of 
view, it hampers estimations of income concentration using tax data, as high personal incomes are not being 
reported in personal tax returns. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is in all likelihood possible that our results are subject to a severe 
under-estimation on account of the pervasiveness of the underground economy in Colombia. In particular, 
income derived from illegal drug trade eludes tax statistics when not going through some form of money 
laundering. Indeed, cocaine trafficking flourished in the late 1980s, and by the 1990s it had percolated through 
Colombia’s political, economic, and social life. The corruptive power of narco-trafficking is thought to remain 
as evident today as in the past, currently constituting the main financial source of criminal organizations, illegal 
armed groups and political parties. Recent estimations calculate that this illegal activity represents roughly 
2.3% of GDP today (Gaviria and Mejía 2011). Since tax data are unable to represent the largeness of the illegal 
economy, reported income shares are under-valued. This is a serious limitation and demands reading our 
results, in this dimension, as closer to a lower bound.7 Yet in spite of this, the main qualitative result remains 
valid: even in spite of a certain degree of under-estimation, Colombia has one of the highest records of 
income concentration.  
 
4. HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS VERSUS TAX DATA 
 
Past studies on income inequality in Colombia have been based on household surveys. Insofar as changes in 
top income shares are capable of significantly impacting changes in overall inequality, it is important to 
understand the extent to which tax data sheds light on an aspect of income inequality that is not as well 
grasped by surveys, namely, the upper end of the distribution. The rich are usually missing from the surveys 
for sampling reasons, low response rates (e.g. refusing to cooperate with the time-consuming task of 
completing a long form), or ex-post elimination of extreme values to minimize bias. When they are included in 
surveys, severe under-reporting may arise because high-income individuals usually have diversified portfolios 
with income flows that are difficult to value; they are also more reluctant to disclose their incomes and wealth. 
Their responses are even top coded by statistics offices. Thus, in studying income concentration in Colombia, 
                                                
6 This anecdotal evidence comes from interviews with DIAN Director Juan Ricardo Ortega, published in El Espectador as 
“Sociedades evasoras” (April 1, 2012), and “Tras la reforma perfecta” (March 13, 2012). 
 
7 Our income control is based on national accounts and, therefore, it is supposed to take into account, at least partially, the flows 
of income generated in the black economy. 
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a series of questions arise: how useful are household surveys to study top shares? To what extent can tax data 
complement household survey data in examining income inequality? 
 
To answer the first question, Table 3 compares statistics of the top percentile from tax data and household 
surveys for years 2007–2010. Columns 1 and 2 display the number of individuals. It is readily apparent that 
the comparison does not come from a perfect match: our population control (adults aged 20 and over) is 
larger than the survey’s. Our income control is also higher, even when, to render both series more comparable, 
we take here the control net of taxes on income and wealth paid by households and net of social security 
contributions paid by workers (columns 3 and 4). The differences stem mainly from the fact that total income 
in surveys measures the reported household income expanded to the entire economy, while our total income 
is computed using national accounts, which track money and better capture large transactions than surveys, 
which instead follow people (Deaton 2005). However, mean incomes (columns 5 and 6) are remarkably 
similar. 
 
 
 
Columns 7 and 8 give the P99 values. Columns 9 and 10 provide the share of the top 1% group. Tax-based 
estimates are 30 to 50% higher than survey-based results. In 2010, the survey-based top 1% share, 13.5%, 
should be compared with the tax-based share, 20.1%. The differences are not only in levels, but also in 
changes: while the survey-based top 1% share decreases between 2007 and 2010, the tax-based figure is more 
stable (or even increasing). 
 
A number of researchers have addressed the differences in the ability of tax data and household survey data to 
represent income inequality, trying to reconcile the evidence using the two sources (Alvaredo 2011; 
Burkhauser et al. 2012). The fact that tax statistics (or, in general, registry data) can provide, under certain 
conditions, valuable information to improve survey-based estimates has been recently the focus of a EU-SILC 
conference.8 The United States and EU countries do combine both sources with different methods and at 
different degrees. In the case of France, for example, the Gini coefficient goes up from 0.39 in 2007 to 0.44 in 
2008; a non-trivial fraction of such increase should be attributed to better-captured disposable incomes from 
registers in 2008 (Burricand 2012). 
                                                
8 Workshop on the use of registers in the context of EU-SILC (Vienna, 5 December 2012) and 2012 International Conference on 
Comparative Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Vienna, 6-7 December, 2012). 
Survey Tax data Survey Tax data Survey Tax data Survey Tax data Survey Tax data Survey Tax data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2007 215.027 264.375 194.519 250.439 9.046 9.473 70.181 74.220 15,2 19,9 137.266 188.201
2008 198.034 269.790 207.000 276.600 10.453 10.252 70.250 80.820 13,8 19,7 143.967 202.120
2009 208.601 275.358 221.385 292.795 10.613 10.633 75.339 87.020 13,9 19,7 147.985 209.677
2010 222.626 281.046 246.520 315.074 11.073 11.211 76.819 91.263 13,5 20,1 149.777 225.053
(in thousands) (%)
Average income in 
economy
Table 3. Comparison of top 1% income share in household surveys and tax data, Colombia 2007-2010
(in thousands)
Note: GEIH: 2006-2010. Tax statistics are computed using 2006-2010 micro-data provided by DIAN. Income in tax data is net of personal 
income taxes and social security contributions. All values are nominal Colombian pesos. Annual values in household surveys are obtained 
multiplying monthly values by 14. Total income corresponds to total household income reported in each survey, and to adjusted household 
income using National Accounts for tax data minus personal income and wealth taxes and social security contributions.
Source: Tax statistics: authors' computations; households surveys: SEDLAC.
(in thousands)Year
Number of individuals 
in top 1%
Total Income P99 Top 1% Income Share Top 1% average Income
(in th. millions)
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We are working on a research project to properly combine survey and tax data to provide a better picture of 
the level and evolution of inequality in a number of Latin American countries. For the moment, using the 
survey-based Gini coefficient for the bottom 99% G*, and the tax-based top 1% income share S, we follow 
Atkinson (2007) and Alvaredo (2011), and re-estimate the Gini coefficient G as 
 𝐺 = !!!!!!𝑃𝑆 + 𝐺∗ 1− 𝑃 1− 𝑆 + 𝑆 − 𝑃   (1) 
 
where β is the tax-based inverted-Pareto coefficient and P is the top group considered (P=0.01 for the top 
1%).9 
 
Given the comparability issues mentioned above, the results, displayed in Table 4, are just a rough 
approximation, but help illustrate the main point. First, and as expected, G ‘corrected’ by tax records is several 
percentage points above the survey-based G. In 2010, the difference between the survey-based top 1% 
income share (13.5%) and the tax-based top 1% income share (20.1%) translates into a ‘corrected’ Gini of 
58.7, to be compared with the Gini for the bottom 99%, 50.0, and the survey-based Gini, 55.4. Second, once 
the Gini coefficient is “corrected” to take into account the higher incomes reported to the income tax, the fall 
                                                
9 Survey-based estimates have been kindly provided by the SEDLAC team directed by Leonardo Gasparini. 
Top 1% net-of-
tax income 
share from tax 
data (%)
Gini coeff G Gini coeff G* (bottom 99%)
Inverted Pareto 
coefficient β
Gini coeff G 
corrected with 
tax-based top 
1% share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2007 19,9 59,0 53,3 2,47 61,2
2008 19,7 54,0 48,4 2,40 57,2
2009 19,7 54,4 48,7 2,28 57,5
2010 20,1 55,4 50,0 2,33 58,7
Note: G denotes the survey-based Gini coefficient of individual income. G* denotes the survey-based
Gini coefficient of the bottom 99% of income receipients. GEIH: 2007-2010. Only income recepients
with positive income were considered. Income in tax data is net of personal income taxes and social
security contributions. The β coefficients reported in column (4) are computed using the top income
share series as β = 1/[log(S1%/S0.1%)/log(10)] where the Sx% is the income share of the top x%. The
corrected Gini coefficient G in column (5) is computed as (for 2010) 100*((2.33-
1)/(2.33+1)*0.01*0.201+0.50*0.99*(1-0.201)+0.201-0.01) = 58.7
Table 4. Top income shares and Gini coefficient in Colombia, 2007-2010
Year
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in inequality between 2007 and 2010 turns out to be smaller than shown in the survey, due to the little 
variability in top shares. 
 
Ongoing work further investigates this issue, enhancing the comparability between the two sources. Only 
recently have surveys in Colombia been made publicly available. 
 
5. THE TAXATION OF HIGH INCOMES AND THE EROSION OF THE TAX BASE 
 
The high pre-tax inequality shown in Section 3 naturally raises the question of the role of taxation. The 
redistributive capacity of income taxes depends on the legal definition of the tax base and the progressiveness 
of the tax schedule. A substantial legal erosion of the tax base would be detrimental to this end, 
notwithstanding the fact that top incomes face statutory top marginal tax rates comparable to OECD 
countries, as shown in Figure 9.10 Indeed, generous tax reliefs have played an important role in shrinking the 
tax burden and eroding the tax base. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The statutory top marginal tax rate in Colombia (available from Table A9 in appendix) was relatively low compared to OECD 
countries before the tax cuts of the late 1980s. Since then, its rates have fluctuated around the OECD average. See Table A12 in 
the appendix for a computation of the marginal tax rates accruing to top incomes, and section E in appendix for a description. 
Source: OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) for OECD countries and DIAN for Colombia
FIGURE 9
Statutory top marginal tax rate in selected countries
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To illustrate this point, Figure 10 compares taxable and non-taxable income for different sub-groups within 
the top percentile in 2010.11 Panel A reflects strictly the situation under the personal income tax: less than 40% 
of the income of the top 1–0.5% is treated as taxable while the bulk is not. The percentage of non-taxable 
income increases with rank, the ultra-rich having only one-tenth of their income considered taxable.  
 
 
 
Panel A in Figure 10 underestimates the fraction of income effectively taxed, because dividends that have 
been taxed at the corporation level are considered non-taxable at the individual level to avoid double taxation. 
Individuals must report dividends, which are de facto net of the tax already paid by firms. The problem here is 
that there is no precise information on their amount: dividends are reported in the same box of the tax form 
together with non-taxable capital gains, insurance payments, donations to political parties (which can be 
received directly by the politicians), employer and employee contributions to pension funds, etc. Panel B of 
Figure 10 assumes that 33% of all amounts reported in such box are dividends, whose tax is ultimately born 
by the taxpayer. Even under this assumption the general picture does not change much: on average, around 
60% of reported incomes are treated as non-taxable, under a variety of forms 
 
A large number of tax reliefs have significantly eroded the tax base and benefited top incomes 
disproportionately. Tax reliefs are classified into three main categories, (i) allowances (ingresos no constitutivo de 
renta), (ii) costs and deductions (costos y deducciones), and (iii) exempted income (renta exenta).12  
 
                                                
11 The situation is similar in the remaining years of our sample. 
12 In parenthesis we provide the denomination of the variable in the tax form in Spanish. 
FIGURE 10
Income composition of top groups: taxable and non taxable income in Colombia, 2010
Source: Table A7.
Notes: Panel B assumes that 33% of income reported as "ingresos no constitutivos de renta" come from taxed dividends.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1-
0.
5
%
0.
5-
0.
1%
0.
1-
0.
05
%
0.
05
-0
.0
1%
0,
01
%
Panel B: income subject to the personal income tax + dividends
taxable income non-taxable income
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1-
0.
5
%
0.
5-
0.
1%
0.
1-
0.
05
%
0.
05
-0
.0
1%
0,
01
%
Panel A: income subject strictly to the personal income tax
taxable income non-taxable income
 19 
Taxable regular income is equal to: 
 Total gross income 
  minus allowances 
  minus costs and deductions 
 minus exempted income 
 
We provide a comprehensive list of these reliefs in Appendix C. We mention here those which, in particular, 
significantly erode the tax base.  
 
Allowances include (1) payments into savings accounts (not only mortgage interest) up to 30% of income with 
the goal of purchasing real estate– this may produce distortions in the saving-investment decisions, and 
implies an easy way out from the tax; (2) voluntary contributions to pension funds up to 30% of income, 
which are linked to non taxable payouts; (3) a fraction of capital incomes and capital gains, including gains 
from stocks transfers, untaxed capitalizations for partners or shareholders, and profits derived from the 
liquidation of companies; (4) unlimited donations to political parties and political campaigns received by 
candidates (the donation is not taxable for the donee). 
 
Under costs and deductions taxpayers can deduct investments in real productive fixed assets,13 other investments, 
charitable donations up to 30% of net income, expenses incurred abroad, expenses in education and health. 
 
Exempted income includes: (1) 25% of wages, up to PPP US$ 53,745 in 2010; and (2) pension payouts up to 
2010 PPP US$ 223,438 in 2010. The high exemption granted on wages represents up to six times the average 
income per adult. The fact that it applies as a percentage rather than as a fixed value favors higher-income 
individuals below the cap. 
 
Avila and Cruz (2011) determine that, in the extreme case of a worker benefitting from the maximum of all 
the tax reliefs available for labor income, he would need a monthly salary at least equal to 14 minimum wages 
to start paying some tax. In annual terms, this is PPP US$ 76,500, while in 2010, our estimated P99 is PPP 
US$ 96,066. 
 
Finally, recent tax changes have further contributed to erode the tax base. To promote formalization among 
small firms, the Santos administration abolished the corporate income tax of 33% for newly-created firms 
under the simplified Sociedad por Acción Simplificada (SAS) regime during their first two years, and reduced the 
rate for three additional years thereafter.14 This policy change may have eroded the income tax base. Further, it 
distorts incentives among tax filers, who may have shifted their income from the personal to the corporate tax 
base to exploit these tax reliefs. The effect of this policy change was discussed in Section 3. 
 
Figure 11 casts further light on the tax reliefs used to reduce tax liabilities. Exemptions fall with rank, given 
that most of them are capped. Allowances and ‘costs and deductions,’ on the contrary, increase with income, 
especially for the richest individuals, who deduct over 80% of their income in this manner. Indeed, the ultra-
rich resort to tax reliefs that are not capped, such as investments in fixed assets (deductible until 2010). 
                                                
13 Created in 2003 to promote investment, this tax stimulus was abolished for 2011 onwards. 
14 The policy gave preferential corporate income tax rates during a total of five years: corporate income tax rate would be equal to 
0 % (0% × 33%) in the first two years, 8.25 % (25% × 33%) in the third year, 16.5 % (50% × 33%) in the fourth year, and 
24.75 % (75% × 33%) in the fifth year (Law 1429/2010). 
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How have these tax reliefs evolved in recent years? Figure 12 decomposes the top 1% and the top 0.01% 
share in taxable, non-taxable income and costs and deductions between 2006 and 2010. The income 
composition has not changed much. 
 
FIGURE 11
Taxable and non taxable income across top groups in Colombia, 2010 
Source: Table A7.
Notes: Panel B assumes that 33% of income reported as "ingresos no constitutivos de renta" come from taxed dividends.
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Given these large tax reliefs, how much do the rich actually pay? Figure 13 presents the average tax rates of 
income tax and social security contributions for different fractiles within the top percentile in 2010 as 
percentage of income. The income tax paid by individuals is shown separately for regular and irregular income, 
FIGURE 12
Top 1% and top 0.01% share composition: taxable and non taxable income. Colombia 2006-2010
Source: Table A4 and Table A7.
Notes: The figures assume that 33% of income reported as "ingresos no constitutivos de renta" come from taxed dividends.
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and social security contributions are shown separately for employees and self-employees. As above, Panel A 
excludes the tax on dividends paid at the corporation level, while Panel B includes them. The concavity in 
both plots of Figure 13 illustrates the lack of progressivity in the Colombian tax system among those who pay 
tax at the upper end of the distribution. The average tax rates fall with income; the bottom half of the top 
percentile pays roughly 12% of their income in income and payroll taxes, while this percentage falls to 8 for 
the top 0.01%.  
 
Six issues are worth mentioning. First, Colombia is not the only country where very high incomes end up 
paying relatively less tax than the rest. While, in many EU countries, the low-income groups pay the highest 
marginal tax rates as a result of means-tested social assistance benefits, the public debate has been recently re-
kindled by a few wealthy businesspersons around the world openly acknowledging that they face lower tax 
rates than the typical middle-income household. This is just the expression of the lower (when compared to 
taxes on labor income) or inexistent taxes on capital incomes and capital gains, which have been justified on 
many grounds, from optimality results derived in theoretical models, to fear of capital flight or tax 
competition. The remarkable fact about Colombia is the extreme modesty of the tax rate at the very top. 
 
Second, as in many other countries, the base for social security contributions is capped, and only applies to 
earned income, which falls with rank (Figure 6). Indeed, social security contributions are trivial for the ultra-
rich, amounting to only 0.3% of their income. This is certainly regressive. 
 
Third, as mentioned above, even under a progressive statutory tax schedule comparable to OECD averages, 
the nature of the tax reliefs make the tax regressive; however, it should be remembered that the majority of 
people at the bottom 80% of the distribution does not pay income taxes at all (but are subject to social 
security contributions if employees o self-employees).  
 
Fourth, results in Panel B of Figure 13 depend on our assumption that 33% of income reported as “ingresos no 
constitutivos de renta” are taxed dividends. Were this percentage larger, or were it increasing with income, the 
resulting average tax rates would also be higher at the very top. E.g. if dividends were 75% instead of 33%, the 
average tax rate for the top 0.01% would be 14% instead of 8%, resulting in an almost flat average tax rate for 
all individuals in the top 1% group. 
 
Five, ‘irregular’ income (donations, capital gains, and inheritance) is subject to the tax schedule independently 
from regular income, that is, regular taxable income is not added to irregular taxable income to determine the 
corresponding statutory marginal tax rate.15 Given the large initial exempted bracket, irregular incomes end up 
paying very little tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 If the asset has been in possession for less than two years, or if the company has not been in existence for so long, the income 
is considered “regular”. 
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FIGURE 13
Income tax and social security contributions at the top. Colombia, 2010
Notes: SSC stands for social security contributions. It is assumed that 33% of 'ingresos no constitutivos de renta'
come from taxed dividends.
Source: Table A7.
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Finally, the very top income recipients can resort to tax reliefs that are not capped, such as investments in real 
productive fixed assets (which were deductible until 2010), and unlimited donations to political campaigns and 
movements received by individuals.16 Most importantly, the rich benefit disproportionately from the allowance 
given to capital income. Indeed, profits derived from stock transfers, dividends, and untaxed capitalizations 
for share-holders are all treated as non-taxable to avoid double taxation. Since the share of capital income 
increases with rank, this allowance benefits the rich disproportionately. Moreover, because of the progressive 
rate schedule, the rich end up benefiting the most from the aforementioned allowances. 
 
These findings raise serious concerns regarding the redistributive capacity of personal taxation in Colombia, a 
situation that the current tax reform changes only slightly.  
 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
 
This work constitutes an effort to estimating top incomes shares in Colombia based on individual tax returns 
and national accounts. These data are used to assess income concentration and its change over time. Our 
results confirm, quantitatively, that income in Colombia is highly concentrated at the top. Our findings 
question the role of income taxation. We argue that the substantial erosion of the tax base, coupled with an 
extremely large initial exempted bracket by international standards, limit the revenue-collecting capacity of the 
income tax and diminish its redistributive impact. This explains why the after-tax income top shares are 
almost as high as before taxes.  
 
Regrettably, as tax returns tabulations and micro-data are only available since 1993, it is not feasible to provide 
an account of the long-run evolution of top shares. A current project seeks to investigate the availability of 
statistics covering the years before 1993. Despite this, and notwithstanding the shortcomings of the available 
data (not the least the pervasiveness of the shadow economy), this work has sought to show that tax records 
combined with national accounts are, under certain circumstances, illustrative in the study of the evolution of 
income inequality, and that they provide insights that elude the existent survey data.  
 
Changes in tax legislation have occurred extremely frequently in Colombia. Since the structural reform of 
1986, the tax code has undergone multiple modifications that have rendered the tax code particularly dense 
and complex, implying an administrative burden that does not seem justified for its outcome.17 The most 
recent tax reform was passed in December 2012, supposedly with the aim of increasing progressivity, and thus 
respecting the principles expressed in the constitution. However, changes are extremely moderate. Complexity 
and administrative costs have increased even more, benefiting those who can afford financial and accountancy 
services.18 Given the observed differences between statutory and effective tax rates, it will be necessary to 
conduct an evaluation of the reform as soon as data are made available for income year 2012. 
 
We hope that our results will encourage the Ministry of Finance and the tax authority of Colombia to provide 
open access to income tax data on a regular basis in the near future. 
                                                
16 Since 2010 was a year of presidential and parliamentary elections in Colombia, this deduction may have been used by high-
income earners to reduce their tax liability. 
17  Tax reforms took place in 1990, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2012. 
18 On the positive side, the reform introduced voluntary personal income tax filing. This is expected to benefit those self-
employees (mostly lower income individuals) who hitherto were not allowed to file a tax return to claim reimbursements, and 
were thus penalized by the withholding system (Moller, 2012). The reform gave much relevance to this, which in any case 
represented a necessary by minor correction. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. DATA SOURCES FOR COLOMBIA 
 
A.1 Tax Statistics 
 
To our knowledge, there have been no official publications providing personal income tax statistics (as the 
ones used in this paper) over the last three decades in Colombia. Our basic raw data sources are two panels of 
micro-data and two sets of tabulations that have been made available by the DIAN especially for us. In 
particular,  
a. Balanced panel of micro-data 2006-2010, which provides information on all the boxes of the 
individual tax file for those individuals who filed a return every year between 2006 and 2010 (60-70% 
of the universe of tax returns). 
b. Unbalanced panel of micro-data 1993-2006, which provides information on a subset of the boxes of 
the individual tax files for the universe of tax filers. Since 2004, the income statement is different for 
those individuals required to keep accounting ledgers (tax form 110) and those not required (tax form 
210). The micro-data include the latter but exclude the former for 2004–2006. 
c. Tabulations 1992-2010, based on the universe of tax filers, which report, by ranges of gross income, 
the total number of tax filers in each range, and most of the key variables of the tax returns (gross 
income, net income, and taxable income, gross wealth; liabilities; wages and salaries; self-employment 
income; interests and other financial income; ‘other’ income; deductions; exemptions; taxable income; 
tax discounts; regular income; tax liabilities; and total tax. 
 
A.2 Population control 
 
The income tax is individually based. Consequently we compute total tax units as all individuals in the 
population aged 20 and over.  The data are obtained from DANE-Series de Población 1985–2020. We present 
results in Table A1, columns [1] and [2]. 
 
A.3 Income control 
 
As described in Atkinson (2007, p. 90), the control total for income can be defined in two different ways. One 
can start from the national accounts figures for total personal income and subtract items towards a definition 
closer to taxable income, or one can start from the income tax statistics and add the incomes of those tax 
units not covered. Given the limited coverage of the personal income tax in Colombia, this study follows the 
first approach. Additionally, the national accounts approach offers more likelihood of comparability with the 
estimates for other countries. 
 
We start from the National Accounts base year 2005, series in current prices, and work backwards as follows: 
Control total for income =  
Balance of households’ primary incomes 
+ Social benefits other than social transfers in kind  
− Employers’ actual social contributions  
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− Imputed social contributions  
− Attributed property income of insurance policyholders  
− Imputed rentals for owner occupied housing  
− Fixed capital consumption 
 
Up to 2011, Colombian national accounts do not provide the information of fixed capital consumption for 
households, which has then been set at 5% of gross values. For the years 1994-2000, we linked each of the 
series above backwards using the National Accounts base year 1994. Finally, for the years before 1994, when 
national accounts are provided at less detailed level, we linked the control total for income backwards 
following the households’ disposable income plus taxes on income and wealth paid by households (base 
year 1975). 
 
This procedure generates a reference income of around 60-65% of GDP. Results are presented in Table A1, 
column [5]. 
 
B. ESTIMATING TOP SHARES 
 
We computed top income shares by combining the micro-data from the panels (a) and (b) of income tax 
returns for the periods 1993–2006 and 2006–2010, and the tabulations (c). 
 
In 2004, the income statement was separated between individuals required to keep accounting ledgers (tax 
form 110) and those not required (tax form 210). The panel (b) includes the latter but exclude the former for 
2004–2006. In contrast, panel (a) is a balanced panel that includes, for both types of filers, those that filed an 
income tax return every year between 2006 and 2010. Such individuals represent between 60 and 70% of the 
total number of tax filers these years. 
 
2006-2010. The fact that panel (a) is a balanced panel poses an empirical challenge due to non-random 
attrition. Additionally, if mobility at the top is high, panel (a) may miss high-income individuals who did not 
file for one or more years. To overcome this issue, we combined the tabulations (c) with the panel (a). Using 
panel (a) we reproduced the tabulations (c) by ranges of gross income. We then computed the ratio [number 
of filers in tabulations/micro-data] by ranges of gross income, and apply those ratios as weights to individuals 
in the balanced panel. In other words, we weighed each filer in the 2006–2010 balanced panel —a fortiori a 
non-attritor— by the total number of tax filers in his income bracket that year. Insofar as this weighting 
procedure awards a larger weight to individuals in the bottom brackets (i.e. those who are most likely to attrite 
since their income is close to the filing thresholds), it enables us to control for non-random attrition, that is, 
for the fact that individuals in the bottom income brackets are most likely to be under-represented in our 
balanced panel. 
 
We corroborate the robustness of the weighing-by-bracket procedure for top income shares in Table A10. We 
exploit the fact that individuals not required to keep accountancy books in 2006 are included in both our 
datasets (a) and (b), and we compare results using different samples. Note that the 1993–2006 micro-data 
include only individuals not required to keep accountancy books in 2006, while the 2006–2010 micro-data 
include both individuals required and those not required to keep accountancy books. First, we present 
estimations using only individuals not required to keep accountancy books from the 1993–2006 micro-data 
(sample A) and compare them to the 2006–2010 micro- data (sample B). Second, we take individuals not 
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required to keep accountancy books from the 1993–2006 micro-data and include individuals required to keep 
accountancy books from the 2006–2010 dataset (sample C), and compare results using both types of filers 
from the 2006–2010 dataset (sample D). Table A10 shows that the weighing-by-bracket procedure does not 
affect results significantly for income shares, validating the robustness of our estimations of top income shares. 
Indeed, given that gross income is a good proxy for our definition of income (especially for filers not required 
to keep accountancy books), the weighing-by-bracket procedure is adequate. 
 
B.1 The definition of income 
 
The definition of income varies for individuals required to keep accountancy books and those who are not. 
For the former, income is defined as total gross regular income, minus one-sixth of ‘other costs and 
deductions’ (following the tax form definition), plus net taxable and non-taxable irregular income. For the 
latter, income is defined as total gross regular income, minus refunds, rebates and discounts on sales, minus 
total costs, minus administrative operational expenses, minus operational sales expenses, minus one-sixth of 
‘other deductions’ (following the tax form definition), plus net taxable and non-taxable irregular income. 
 
Regrettably, the 1993–2006 micro-data do not include most of the variables required to define income as we 
do above. We compute our income variable for these years in the following way. We organize individuals by 
level of gross income so as to reproduce the tax tabulations with the 2006–2010 micro-data, including a 
column for our newly-defined income. Second, for each bracket 𝑏 in the tabulations, we compute the ratio of 
our income definition over total gross income 𝐷!. Third, we calculate the simple arithmetic mean of 𝐷!! for 
the period of 2006–2010, 𝐷!! by each type 𝑡 of filer, and then calculate the weighted average for the entire 
filing population by bracket, 𝑦! .19 Finally, recreating the tabulations using the 1993–2006 micro-data, we 
multiply gross income by 𝑦! for each bracket to obtain an approximate measure of our definition of income. 
Note that in doing so, we are assuming that the share of shopkeepers 𝑝, and that the ratios 𝐷!!  for each type 𝑡 
of filers, all remain constant throughout the period. 
 
The 1992–2010 tabulations were used to link the results obtained from the 1993–2006 and 2006– 2010 micro-
datasets. First, 𝐷!! was used to approximate a measure of income per bracket 𝑏 and by type 𝑡 of filer for the 
years of 2004 and 2005, missing in the 1993–2006 and 2006–2010 datasets. Second, applying simple Pareto 
interpolations, we calculate income shares using these tabulations and the same definition of income described 
above for the entire period of 1993–2010. Third, the variation of the income share produced by the Pareto 
interpolation was used to link the 1993–2006 and 2006–2010 results. Finally, an upscale factor, equal to the 
ratio of the estimate produced by the 2006–2010 micro-data and the Pareto interpolation for the year of 2006, 
was computed backwards to re-compute estimations for the years of 1993–2003. Note that due to high 
measurement error, the series could only be linked for the top 1%. 
 
It is possible that our estimations of income shares are slightly affected due to the definition of income we 
have described in Section 2. To analyze the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of income, we 
                                                
19 This is the equivalent as computing 𝑦! = 𝑝 𝐷!! +   (1 − 𝑝)𝐷!! where 𝑝 stands for the probability that the filer be required to 
keep an accountancy book, and 1 − 𝑝  the probability that she is not required. 
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compare the income share of the top percentile using different definitions in Table A11. First, we include 
‘other costs and deductions’ (tax form 210) and ‘other deductions’ (tax form 110) completely, assuming that 
none of the items included represent costs incurred to obtain that income (column B). Second, we subtract 
the deduction for investments in fixed assets (column C). Third, we exclude the allowance on ‘non-taxable 
income’, or ‘ingreso no constitutivo de renta’ (column D). Fourth, we exclude net taxable and non taxable 
irregular income to focus exclusively on regular income (column E). Fifth, we assume that one-half of ‘other 
costs and deductions’ (tax code 210) and ‘other deductions’ (tax code 110) are costs necessary to obtain 
income (column F). Finally, we assume that all items included in ‘other costs and deductions’ (tax code 210) 
and ‘other deductions’ (tax code 110) are costs incurred to obtain that income, and exclude all items from the 
benchmark definition of income (column G). The result of comparing these alternative definitions of income 
suggests that the evolution of top income shares is not affected by our definition of income. That is, although 
the level of income inequality may be slightly affected by our choice of income, the change in income 
concentration is not. We can thus trust that our analysis of the evolution of top income shares reflects real 
changes in income disparities in Colombia. 
 
C. PERSONAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES IN COLOMBIA 
 
For regular income, there are the following tax reliefs:  
 
(i) Allowances. The main allowances include: (1) payments into savings accounts (and not only mortgage 
interest) up to 30% of income with the goal of purchasing real estate– this may produce distortions in the 
savings and investments decisions, and implies an easy way out from the tax; (2) mandatory pension 
contributions and voluntary contributions up to 30% of labor income; (3) a fraction of capital incomes and 
capital gains, including gains from stocks transfers, untaxed capitalizations for partners or shareholders, the 
inflationary component of financial gains and returns from mutual investment and securities funds, dividends 
already subject to the corporation tax, and profits derived from the liquidation of companies; (4) employers’ 
contributions to severance funds; (5) a fraction of gains from transactions of residential properties purchased 
before 1987; (6) insurance compensations for damages; (7) for employees earning below 2010 $7.6 million 
(PPP US$ 5,785), payments under 2010 $1 million pesos (PPP US$ 765) for alimony; (8) unlimited donations 
to political parties and campaigns received by individuals. 
 
(ii) Costs and deductions. Total costs and deductions differ across types of filers. For employees earning less than 
2010 $113 million pesos (PPP US$ 98,800), deductions include up to 15% of taxable labor income in 
voluntary healthcare contributions and education expenses, or mortgage interest payments for residential 
housing below 2010 $30 million pesos (PPP US$22,800). For self-employed workers, deductions include some 
self-employment income, mortgage interest payments for residential housing below 2010 $30 million pesos 
(PPP US$22,800), and up to 2,500 UVT (2010 $61.4 million pesos) of contributions to severance funds under 
one-twelfth of annual taxable income.20 For all types of filers, additional costs and deductions include: (1) 
mandatory healthcare contributions; (2) investments in real productive fixed assets21; (3) charitable donations 
                                                
20 Deductibles are capped at 50 percent of their income, unless adequate receipts and proofs of payment are shown. 
 
21 Created in 2003 to promote investment, this tax stimulus was abolished for 2011 onwards. 
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under 30% of the taxpayer’s net income; (4) other tax payments, such as payroll taxes and 25% of the financial 
transactions tax; and additional smaller items. 
 
(iii) Exempted income. Exemptions include: (1) 25% of wages, up to 2010 $70,718,400 pesos (PPP US$ 53,745); 
(2) pension payouts up to 2010 $294 million pesos (PPP US$ 223,438); (3) severance payments for employees 
earning below 2010 $8.6 million pesos (PPP US$ 6,536); and (4) compensations for occupational hazards, 
illnesses, and motherhood. It is worth noting that the extremely high exemption granted on wages represents 
up to six times the average income per adult. Insofar as it benefits wage earners disproportionately, it fosters 
horizontal inequality among tax filers. Moreover, the fact that it applies as a percentage rather than as a fixed 
value favors higher-income individuals below the cap. 
 
For irregular income, allowances and exemptions include: (1) for the spouse and heirs, the initial 2010 
$29,466,000 pesos (PPP US$22,394) of the value received; (2) for donations and inheritances received by 
individuals other than the spouse or heirs, 20% of the value received, up to 2010 $29,466,000 pesos (PPP 
US$22,394); and (3) prizes in equestrian and canine competitions under 2010 $10 million pesos (PPP 
US$7,651). 
 
D. THE ISSUE OF TAX AVOIDANCE IN COLOMBIA 
 
A branch of the empirical literature on taxation has focused on bunching, that is, the behavioral response of 
taxable income at kink points. Most of the literature is based on developed economies–  notably the United 
States (Saez 2010) and recently in some Nordic countries (Bastani and Selin 2012; Chetty et al. 2011; le Maire 
and Schjerning 2012).22 
 
There are strong reasons to study bunching in Colombia. First, tax filers have severe incentives to bunch. The 
literature has shown that large kinks generate disproportionately stronger bunching responses than small kinks, 
consistent with the hypothesis that tax filers pay more attention to large changes than to small ones (Saez et al. 
2012). In Colombia, after the initial exempted bracket, tax liability starts at a rate of 19%. Second, there is a 
large number of ways to reduce tax liabilities via items deemed ‘non-taxable’, exempted or deducted from the 
income tax. 
 
We find evidence of bunching at the threshold of the tax bracket where tax liability starts and the marginal 
rate jumps from 0 to 19%. Like Saez (2010), we cannot find any bunching evidence for the second kink point, 
even when restricting the sample to more responsive sub-groups such as those reporting self-employment 
income. Moreover, we find only mild bunching evidence for the top kink point (Figure A1 Panel B and Figure 
A4). A likely explanation for this is the fact that the first kink point of the income tax schedule is the income 
level where tax liability starts, and hence is more visible on tax tables than kink points at higher income levels 
(Saez 2010). 
 
Figure A1, Panel A displays the frequency distributions of taxable regular income for individuals not required 
to keep accountancy books (tax form 210), expressed in UVT and aggregating years 2007-2010. The marginal 
                                                
22 Kleven and Waseem (2012) study on Pakistan is an exception. 
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tax rate schedule is displayed in a dashed line, and the kernel density of taxable income is plotted in a solid line. 
In all years, the kink point is at 1090 UVT (2010 $26,764,950 pesos, or roughly 2010 PPP US$20,341), as 
depicted by the vertical line. The density peaks just before the kink point, providing compelling evidence that 
the change in marginal tax rates produces a behavioral response of reported taxable regular income. A 
potential objection is that individuals may not systematically file tax returns if their taxable income is below 
1090 UVT, as filing thresholds in Colombia are extremely high. Figure A1 Panel A, however, shows that there 
is no missing density just below the kink point. 
 
Figure A2 compares bunching at the first kink point for three types of filers in the Colombian tax code, 
namely wage earners, self-employed workers and ‘other’ tax filers. Unlike in previous studies, in Colombia 
there is bunching evidence among all types of filers, notably including employees. 
 
Recently, the empirical literature on bunching has sought to construct measures of the excess mass of tax 
filers at the kink by locally comparing the mass of individuals at the kink point with the mass of individuals at 
the same taxable income level in the absence of a kink, i.e. the counterfactual distribution. The key 
methodological challenge here is to remove the influence of the kink from the observed income distribution 
to obtain this counterfactual distribution. We use the refined estimation procedure proposed by Chetty et al. 
(2011), estimating the counterfactual distribution using non-parametric methods. Specifically, the 
counterfactual distribution is estimated by fitting a polynomial to the taxable income distribution, omitting an 
income band surrounding the kink and then adjusting the mass of the counterfactual distribution so that it 
integrates to one. 
 
Our estimation procedure, which draws on Chetty et al. (2011) and Bastani and Selin (2012), proceeds as 
follows. First, we pool data from 2007 to 2010 and express taxable income in CPI-adjusted values, or UVT. 
Second, a ‘wide bunching window' around the kink point is specified and taxable regular income is re-defined 
in terms of the absolute distance to the kink point. This window specifies the sample to be used in estimating 
bunching and the counterfactual distribution. The data is then collapsed into bins of width 2 UVT, where 2 
UVT is a CPI-adjusted value equal to 2010 $49,100 or around 2010 PPP US$37. Each bin 𝑗 is represented by 
an income level 𝑍! , defined as the mean absolute income distance between the observations falling within 
income bin 𝑗  and the kink point. In other words, 𝑍!   is the distance between bin 𝑗  and the kink point 
(measured in steps of 2 UVT). Visual inspection of the histogram for 𝑍! guides the selection of a bandwidth R 
and the associated ‘small bunching window’, −𝑅,𝑅 . Provided that choosing R too small (large) will 
underestimate (overestimate) bunching, this window should ideally be chosen so as to capture exactly those 
individuals bunching. The number of individuals in income bin 𝑗 is given by the non-parametric regression: 
 𝐶! = 𝑤(𝑍! ,𝑅)+ 𝜇!      (2) 
 
where w is a polynomial in 𝑍! excluding the data near the kink (as measured by R) and 𝜇! accounts for the 
error in the polynomial fit. In our estimations we use the same iterative procedure as in Chetty et al. (2011), 
but unlike them, our calculation overestimates bunching because it does not account for the fact that 
individuals at the kink point come from points to the right of the kink. That is, it does not satisfy the 
constraint that the area under the counterfactual must equal the area under the empirical distribution. Further 
work must overcome this important limitation by increasing the mass of the counterfactual distribution to the 
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right of the kink upward until it satisfies the integration constraint. 
 
Denote 𝐶! the predicted values from regression above. Bunching, quantified by the excess mass of tax filers at 
the kink point or b, is estimated as the number of tax filers at the kink point, 𝐵, relative to the average height 
of the counterfactual distribution in the band −𝑅,𝑅 : 
 𝑏 = ! !!!!!!!!!        (3) 
 
In the figures below, the histogram is displayed in a series of dots, and the solid line plots the polynomial 
fitted to the taxable regular income distribution, excluding bins in the ‘small bunching window’. We report 
estimates of the excess mass 𝑏 in each figure, and standard errors are calculated using a parametric bootstrap 
procedure. 
 
Figure A3 shows that there is a spike in the otherwise smooth income distribution around the first kink, where 
the marginal rate jumps from 0 to 19%. The predicted (albeit overestimated) excess mass is equal to a high 8.0. 
 
In contrast, Figure A4 shows that there is very little bunching around the top kink. The excess mass is equal to 
1.7, and this low value may be overestimated due to the reasons explained above. This result is rather 
encouraging for our analysis of top incomes. Indeed, almost all individuals in the top groups are located in the 
top bracket, being subject to the top marginal tax rate. The fact that they do not bunch suggests that they are 
less able to manipulate their reported income, and thus that our estimations are not terribly biased due to 
manipulation by tax filers. 
 
E. COMPUTING MARGINAL TAX RATES 
 
Marginal tax rates 𝑡∗ for top percentiles displayed in Table A.12 were computed using the balanced panel of 
individual income tax returns 2006-2010. First, marginal tax rates for the personal tax on regular, 𝑡!! , and on 
irregular income, 𝑡!! , were computed for each individual 𝑖 as a function of taxable regular income, 𝑎! and 
taxable irregular income 𝑏! , respectively, following the tax schedule. Second, official individual marginal tax 
rates, 𝑡!!  were computed as follows: 
 𝑡!!   = !!!!!!! ∗ 𝑡!! + !!!!!!! ∗ 𝑡!!      (4) 
 
Third, to create marginal tax rates for each top group, 𝑡! , we must correct for non-random attrition 
by weighing 𝑎! and 𝑏! . The weighted sum of individual taxable sources, 𝑘! , is given by 𝑘! = 𝑤!(𝑎! + 𝑏!). 
Fourth, individual rates relative to the top group were created, such that: 
 𝑡! = !!!! ∗ 𝑡!!       (5) 
 
Where 𝐾! = 𝑘! in each top group 𝐺. The result was then collapsed by top group for each year, to create 𝑡∗. 
Table A12 presents the result of this exercise. 
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F. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Inflation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Population Tax Units Number of (3)/(2) Total income Total income GDP Total income Average income Average income Legislated monthly CPI
adults 20+ yo tax returns (%) (th. million (current th. (current th. over GDP (thousand (2010 Min. wage x 14 (2010 base)
('000s) ('000s) ('000s) 2010 Pesos) million Pesos) million Pesos) (%) 2010 Pesos) US Dollars) (th. 2010 Pesos)
1990 34.130          18.521          199.817        18.782          28.651          65,55 10.789           5.394           9,40
1991 34.831          18.987          207.990        25.488          37.117          68,67 10.954           5.477           12,25
1992 35.521          19.441          418              2,15 209.350        32.587          47.371          68,79 10.769           5.384           15,57
1993 36.207          19.891          382              1,92 223.890        42.671          62.324          68,47 11.256           5.628           5.987           19,06
1994 36.854          20.332          378              1,86 233.251        54.612          80.520          67,82 11.472           5.736           5.902           23,41
1995 37.472          20.774          369              1,78 233.684        66.145          100.678        65,70 11.249           5.624           5.883           28,31
1996 38.068          21.209          370              1,74 229.889        78.604          120.079        65,46 10.839           5.420           5.819           34,19
1997 38.636          21.646          364              1,68 232.838        94.316          145.113        64,99 10.756           5.378           5.945           40,51
1998 39.184          22.088          346              1,57 230.515        110.815        167.500        66,16 10.436           5.218           5.936           48,07
1999 39.731          22.540          331              1,47 231.003        123.124        180.713        68,13 10.249           5.124           6.211           53,30
2000 40.296          23.009          330              1,43 237.435        138.228        208.531        66,29 10.319           5.160           6.255           58,22
2001 40.814          23.469          337              1,44 241.019        151.491        225.851        67,08 10.270           5.135           6.370           62,85
2002 41.329          23.938          356              1,49 244.981        163.762        245.323        66,75 10.234           5.117           6.472           66,85
2003 41.849          24.421          474              1,94 244.794        175.304        272.345        64,37 10.024           5.012           6.490           71,61
2004 42.368          24.913          732              2,94 260.615        197.652        307.762        64,22 10.461           5.230           6.609           75,84
2005 42.889          25.409          824              3,24 270.589        215.582        340.156        63,38 10.649           5.325           6.704           79,67
2006 43.406          25.914          936              3,61 285.626        237.332        383.898        61,82 11.022           5.511           6.874           83,09
2007 43.927          26.438          1.008           3,81 303.108        265.822        431.072        61,67 11.465           5.733           6.923           87,70
2008 44.451          26.979          1.069           3,96 314.191        294.821        481.037        61,29 11.646           5.823           6.885           93,84
2009 44.979          27.536          1.136           4,13 321.038        313.906        508.532        61,73 11.659           5.829           7.115           97,78
2010 45.510          28.105          1.124           4,00 338.437        338.437        548.273        61,73 12.042           6.021           7.210           100,00
TABLE A1. Reference totals for population, income, and inflation. Colombia, 1990-2010
Population and Tax Units Total Income 
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Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income Colombian $
expressed as 
multiple of 
average 
income
1991 12.000.000 8,9 8.000.000 6,0 3.000.000 2,2 15.000.000 11,2
1992 20.300.000 12,1 13.500.000 8,1 5.100.000 3,0 39.000.000 23,3
1993 25.600.000 11,9 17.000.000 7,9 6.400.000 3,0 49.200.000 22,9
1994 31.200.000 11,6 20.800.000 7,7 7.800.000 2,9 60.100.000 22,4
1995 38.200.000 12,0 25.400.000 8,0 9.500.000 3,0 73.500.000 23,1
1996 46.100.000 12,4 30.700.000 8,3 11.500.000 3,1 88.800.000 24,0
1997 54.400.000 12,5 36.300.000 8,3 13.600.000 3,1 104.700.000 24,0
1998 63.100.000 12,6 42.100.000 8,4 15.800.000 3,1 121.500.000 24,2
1999 73.900.000 13,5 49.300.000 9,0 18.500.000 3,4 142.200.000 26,0
2000 80.800.000 13,4 53.900.000 9,0 20.200.000 3,4 155.500.000 25,9
2001 88.000.000 13,6 58.700.000 9,1 22.000.000 3,4 169.500.000 26,3
2002 95.100.000 13,9 63.400.000 9,3 23.800.000 3,5 183.200.000 26,8
2003 60.000.000 8,4 60.000.000 8,4 23.800.000 3,3 150.000.000 20,9
2004 60.000.000 7,6 60.000.000 7,6 25.000.000 3,2 80.000.000 10,1 80.000.000 10,1 50.000.000 6,3 50.000.000 6,3
2005 63.660.000 7,5 63.660.000 7,5 26.525.000 3,1 84.880.000 10,0 84.880.000 10,0 53.050.000 6,3 53.050.000 6,3
2006 66.888.000 7,3 66.888.000 7,3 27.870.000 3,0 89.183.000 9,7 89.183.000 9,7 55.740.000 6,1 55.740.000 6,1
2007 69.214.200 6,9 69.214.200 6,9 29.363.600 2,9 94.383.000 9,4 94.383.000 9,4 58.727.200 5,8 58.727.200 5,8
2008 72.778.200 6,7 72.778.200 6,7 30.875.600 2,8 99.243.000 9,1 99.243.000 9,1 61.751.200 5,7 61.751.200 5,7
2009 78.417.900 6,9 78.417.900 6,9 33.268.200 2,9 106.933.500 9,4 106.933.500 9,4 66.536.400 5,8 66.536.400 5,8
2010 100.012.515 8,3 81.031.500 6,7 34.377.000 2,9 110.497.500 9,2 110.497.500 9,2 68.754.000 5,7 68.754.000 5,7
Wealth criteria Expenditure criteria
Table A2. Tax filing thresholds. Personal income tax, Colombia 1991-2010
Gross Wealth
Total value of bank deposits 
or financial investments Credit card expenditure Total expenditure
Employees Self-employee Other income receipients
Income criteria
Gross Income
Sources: Ley 49 de 1990; Decreto 2064 de 1992; Decreto 2511 de 1993; Decreto 2798 de 1994; Decreto 2321 de 1995; Decreto 2300 de 1996; Decreto 3049 de 1997; Decreto 3020 de 1998; Decreto 2587 de 1999; Decreto 2588 de 
1999; Decreto 2661 de 2000; 2002: Ley 49 de 1990, Decreto 2794 de 2001; 2003: Ley 788 de 2002, Decreto 3257 de 2002; 2004: Ley 788 de 2002, Ley 863 de 2003; 2005: Ley 788 de 2002, Decreto 4344 de 2004, Decreto 44715 de 
2005; Art 51 de Ley 1111 de 2006.
Notes: For filing purposes, individuals are categorised by source of income. An individual is considered an employee if she is not responsible for the sales  tax and receives at least 80 percent of her gross  income as wages. An 
individual is considered a self-employee if she receives at least 80 per cent of her gross income as fees, commissions, and payment for services taxed at the source. If less than 80 per cent of an individual’s total gross  income  comes 
from  such sources  (or  if the individual does not  have the receipts to prove so), then she is considered a “low-income taxpayer” (in the table referred to as 'Other income receipients').
The table reads as follow: in 2010, an individual was obliged to file for the income tax if (i) she was an employee with at least $100,012,515 in gross income; or (ii) she was a self-employee with at least $81,031,500 in gross income; or 
(iii) she was a 'low-income' individual with at least $34,377,000 in gross income; or (iv) her gross wealth was at least $110,497,500; or (v) she had bank deposits and financial investments for at least $110,497,500; or (vi) her 
expenditure through credit cards was at least $68,754,000; or (vii) her total expenditure was at least 68,754,000.
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Professional risks CCF ICBF SENA
Bonus (Prima 
de servicios)
Christmas 
bonus Holidays
Unemployment 
contributions
Interests on 
unemployment 
contributions
Unemployment 
contribution for 
unjustified 
dismissal
Total employer employee employer employee employee employer employer employer employer Total employer employer employer employer employer employer
1992 7,0% 4,67% 2,33% 4,33% 2,17% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1993 7,0% 4,67% 2,33% 5,33% 2,67% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1994 8,0% 5,3% 2,7% 8,6% 2,9% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,30% 1,00% 4,17%
1995 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 9,4% 3,1% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1996 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1997 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1998 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
1999 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2000 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2001 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2002 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2003 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,1% 3,4% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2004 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 10,9% 3,6% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2005 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 11,3% 3,8% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2006 12,0% 8,0% 4,0% 11,6% 3,9% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2007 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2008 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2009 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2010 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2011 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
2012 12,5% 8,5% 4,0% 12,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,0% 2,0% 9,0% 8,33% 8,33% 4,17% 8,33% 1,00% 4,17%
Earnings Solidaridad Subsistencia Total Risk class Min. contribution
Max. 
contribution
expressed as 
multiple of 
minimum wage 1 0,348% 0,696%
2 0,435% 1,653%
0-4 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 3 0,783% 4,089%
4-16 0,50% 0,50% 1,00% 4 1,740% 6,060%
5 3,219% 8,700%
0-4 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
4-16 0,50% 0,50% 1,00%
16-17 0,50% 0,70% 1,20%
17-18 0,50% 0,90% 1,40%
18-19 0,50% 1,10% 1,60%
19-20 0,50% 1,30% 1,80%
>20 0,50% 1,50% 2,00%
Notes:
ICBF: Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar. CCF: Cajas de Compensación Familiar. SENA: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje.
The minimum wage is the SMLMV: Salario mínimo legal mensual vigente .
Sources: Mondragon-Velez et al. (2010), Santamaria et al. (2007), tax codes.
For employees, the contribution base is 100 per cent of the wage, or 70 per cent if the wage earner recieves an "integral" salary (i.e. one that includes bonuses, severance payments, etc.). Employer and employee can decide on an "integral" salary only 
if the salary is greater than 10 times the minimum wage.  There is a minimum cap equal to 1 minimum wage (SMLMV) and a maximum cap equal to 20 minimum wages (1993-2003) or 25 minimum wages (2003-2010). For self-employees, the social 
security base is 40% of gross revenues, with the same minimum and maximum caps. Other non-wage labour costs not included in the table are work uniform and transport subsidies mandated by law for low-income employees.
up to 2002
since 2003
Professional risks
employer
Table A3. Social security contributions. Colombia, 1992-2012
Healthcare
employee
Parafiscales
Variable with 
activity, and 
ranging from 
0.348% to 8.7%. 
See below sub-
table Professional 
risks .
Other charges on:
Pension
Employees 
pay an 
additional 
contribution 
variable with 
earnings. 
See below 
sub-table 
Fondo de 
Solidaridad 
Pensional .
Fondo de Solidaridad Pensional
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Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01% Top 0.01-0.001%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1993 20,5 16,4 8,4 5,8 2,1 0,5 4,1 8,1 2,6 3,7 1,6
1994 20,5 16,3 8,1 5,4 1,9 0,4 4,2 8,2 2,7 3,5 1,5
1995 20,8 16,3 7,9 5,2 1,9 0,4 4,4 8,5 2,7 3,3 1,4
1996 21,3 16,6 7,7 5,0 1,8 0,5 4,7 8,9 2,6 3,2 1,4
1997 20,9 16,3 7,5 5,0 1,9 0,5 4,6 8,8 2,5 3,1 1,4
1998 19,8 15,4 7,0 4,6 1,8 0,5 4,4 8,4 2,3 2,9 1,3
1999 18,1 14,1 6,3 4,2 1,6 0,5 4,0 7,8 2,1 2,6 1,1
2000 17,3 13,7 6,1 4,1 1,6 0,5 3,6 7,6 2,0 2,5 1,1
2001 17,3 13,6 6,0 4,0 1,5 0,5 3,7 7,6 2,0 2,5 1,1
2002 18,0 13,9 6,0 4,0 1,6 0,5 4,0 7,9 1,9 2,5 1,0
2003 19,9 14,6 6,0 4,1 1,6 0,5 5,3 8,6 2,0 2,5 1,1
2004 17,8
2005 18,8
2006 19,9 15,0 7,6 5,7 2,9 1,1 4,9 7,4 1,9 2,8 1,7
2007 20,5 15,4 7,8 5,8 3,0 1,2 5,1 7,6 2,0 2,8 1,7
2008 20,3 15,2 7,5 5,5 2,7 1,0 5,1 7,7 2,0 2,8 1,7
2009 20,2 14,9 7,1 5,1 2,4 0,9 5,2 7,8 2,0 2,7 1,6
2010 20,4 15,2 7,4 5,4 2,6 1,0 5,2 7,8 2,0 2,7 1,6
Table A4. Top income shares, Colombia 1993-2010
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Year Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05%Top 0.05-0.01%Top 0.01-0.001% P99 P99.5 P99.9 P99.95 P99.99 P99.999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
1993 230.512 369.780 940.536 1.295.779 2.357.322 5.155.611 91.244 227.091 585.292 1.030.394 2.046.401 59.778 121.001 437.261 719.338 1.339.673 3.055.851
1994 235.623 374.848 928.267 1.235.780 2.211.483 4.575.034 96.398 236.493 620.753 991.854 1.948.866 59.962 128.270 445.134 693.857 1.358.345 2.773.787
1995 233.552 367.828 883.127 1.160.345 2.083.984 4.619.739 99.276 239.003 605.908 929.435 1.802.233 61.386 129.582 463.626 676.167 1.282.169 2.533.038
1996 230.854 358.995 831.698 1.092.426 2.000.631 5.058.221 102.713 240.819 570.970 865.375 1.660.898 64.508 132.713 446.254 621.027 1.183.869 2.389.033
1997 224.281 349.992 807.712 1.067.061 2.002.839 5.452.980 98.571 235.562 548.363 833.117 1.619.490 61.169 129.759 421.155 585.690 1.109.382 2.335.843
1998 206.360 321.330 727.260 968.339 1.858.125 5.469.865 91.390 219.848 486.181 745.892 1.456.821 55.367 123.169 388.477 511.069 1.024.423 2.390.809
1999 185.494 289.048 648.230 865.205 1.685.004 5.078.892 81.940 199.252 431.255 660.256 1.307.905 48.503 112.517 343.573 455.144 909.675 2.112.837
2000 178.705 282.757 629.848 843.178 1.624.712 4.839.577 74.653 195.984 416.518 647.795 1.267.504 43.811 105.196 334.138 438.164 888.793 2.079.080
2001 177.806 280.068 614.734 826.155 1.591.328 4.906.464 75.544 196.401 403.314 634.861 1.222.979 43.995 107.115 325.542 424.060 857.645 2.014.915
2002 183.755 284.663 610.842 824.707 1.602.786 5.307.582 82.847 203.118 396.978 630.187 1.191.142 47.646 117.079 325.442 421.634 845.452 1.895.884
2003 199.671 293.001 604.810 817.271 1.580.073 5.220.327 106.341 215.049 392.350 626.570 1.175.601 73.588 124.501 324.005 438.093 826.713 1.901.168
2004 186.255 78.649
2005 200.197 83.709
2006 219.767 330.804 840.157 1.250.527 3.157.631 12.646.527 108.731 203.466 429.787 773.751 2.103.309 88.769 137.412 356.200 536.509 1.316.380 5.117.607
2007 234.973 353.770 891.919 1.323.053 3.382.314 13.864.922 116.176 219.232 460.784 808.238 2.217.580 94.203 147.808 383.783 570.290 1.346.454 5.526.192
2008 235.883 353.198 872.624 1.278.179 3.156.037 11.920.018 118.568 223.342 467.068 808.714 2.182.262 95.600 151.241 389.228 574.346 1.332.573 5.125.745
2009 235.106 347.936 830.763 1.197.711 2.841.088 10.213.877 122.275 227.229 463.816 786.867 2.021.889 98.664 155.293 390.589 567.750 1.279.498 4.681.815
2010 246.226 366.049 886.920 1.291.826 3.185.014 12.616.031 126.403 235.831 482.015 818.529 2.137.123 101.293 160.930 404.750 590.534 1.343.255 4.792.947
1993 115.256 184.890 470.268 647.890 1.178.661 2.577.805 45.622 113.545 292.646 515.197 1.023.200 29.889 60.500 218.631 359.669 669.836 1.527.926
1994 117.811 187.424 464.133 617.890 1.105.742 2.287.517 48.199 118.246 310.377 495.927 974.433 29.981 64.135 222.567 346.928 679.173 1.386.893
1995 116.776 183.914 441.563 580.172 1.041.992 2.309.869 49.638 119.502 302.954 464.718 901.116 30.693 64.791 231.813 338.083 641.085 1.266.519
1996 115.427 179.498 415.849 546.213 1.000.315 2.529.110 51.356 120.410 285.485 432.688 830.449 32.254 66.356 223.127 310.513 591.934 1.194.516
1997 112.141 174.996 403.856 533.531 1.001.419 2.726.490 49.285 117.781 274.182 416.558 809.745 30.585 64.879 210.578 292.845 554.691 1.167.921
1998 103.180 160.665 363.630 484.169 929.063 2.734.932 45.695 109.924 243.090 372.946 728.410 27.683 61.585 194.239 255.535 512.211 1.195.405
1999 92.747 144.524 324.115 432.603 842.502 2.539.446 40.970 99.626 215.628 330.128 653.953 24.251 56.258 171.786 227.572 454.838 1.056.419
2000 89.352 141.378 314.924 421.589 812.356 2.419.789 37.326 97.992 208.259 323.898 633.752 21.906 52.598 167.069 219.082 444.397 1.039.540
2001 88.903 140.034 307.367 413.077 795.664 2.453.232 37.772 98.200 201.657 317.431 611.490 21.997 53.557 162.771 212.030 428.823 1.007.458
2002 91.878 142.332 305.421 412.353 801.393 2.653.791 41.424 101.559 198.489 315.093 595.571 23.823 58.540 162.721 210.817 422.726 947.942
2003 99.836 146.501 302.405 408.635 790.037 2.610.163 53.171 107.524 196.175 313.285 587.800 36.794 62.250 162.002 219.046 413.357 950.584
2004 93.128 39.324
2005 100.099 41.854
2006 109.884 165.402 420.079 625.263 1.578.815 6.323.264 54.365 101.733 214.894 386.875 1.051.654 44.385 68.706 178.100 268.255 658.190 2.558.803
2007 117.486 176.885 445.959 661.527 1.691.157 6.932.461 58.088 109.616 230.392 404.119 1.108.790 47.102 73.904 191.891 285.145 673.227 2.763.096
2008 117.942 176.599 436.312 639.089 1.578.019 5.960.009 59.284 111.671 233.534 404.357 1.091.131 47.800 75.621 194.614 287.173 666.287 2.562.873
2009 117.553 173.968 415.382 598.855 1.420.544 5.106.938 61.138 113.615 231.908 393.433 1.010.944 49.332 77.647 195.295 283.875 639.749 2.340.908
2010 123.113 183.024 443.460 645.913 1.592.507 6.308.015 63.202 117.915 241.008 409.264 1.068.562 50.647 80.465 202.375 295.267 671.627 2.396.474
A. In 2010 Colombian Pesos (thousand)
Table A5. Incomes at the top. Colombia 1993-2010
B. In 2010 US Dollars
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2006 29,7 17,3 42,2 2,7 5,0 3,1 23,6 17,4 47,9 2,8 4,9 3,4 12,2 14,7 60,7 3,0 4,8 4,5
2007 27,7 18,1 42,4 3,1 5,8 3,0 21,9 18,4 47,6 3,2 5,7 3,3 10,8 15,8 59,7 3,5 5,9 4,3
2008 28,3 18,1 42,3 3,5 5,6 2,1 22,5 18,5 47,7 3,6 5,5 2,2 11,3 16,0 60,6 4,0 5,6 2,6
2009 29,3 18,6 40,8 3,7 5,1 2,5 23,6 19,2 45,8 3,8 5,0 2,7 11,9 17,4 58,0 4,1 5,0 3,6
2010 28,6 18,4 41,2 3,5 5,5 2,9 23,0 18,8 45,9 3,6 5,5 3,2 11,5 16,5 57,6 4,1 6,0 4,3
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2006 9,3 12,7 65,0 3,1 4,9 5,2 5,1 7,1 73,1 3,2 4,8 6,8 3,5 0,4 80,0 3,6 4,2 8,3
2007 8,2 13,6 63,6 3,7 6,0 4,9 4,4 7,5 70,3 4,4 6,5 6,8 1,8 1,6 75,6 6,0 6,8 8,3
2008 8,6 13,9 64,9 4,2 5,5 2,8 4,8 8,7 72,7 4,8 5,6 3,3 3,5 1,6 81,9 6,7 3,0 3,3
2009 9,1 15,5 62,2 4,2 5,0 4,0 5,1 10,5 70,5 4,2 4,6 5,1 1,3 3,2 80,8 4,2 3,3 7,1
2010 8,5 14,5 61,2 4,5 6,3 5,0 4,3 8,7 68,3 5,7 6,7 6,4 1,2 2,6 74,2 7,5 7,6 7,0
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2006 48,9 16,7 24,3 2,6 5,3 2,1 35,7 20,3 34,0 2,6 5,0 2,3 21,1 20,7 48,3 2,7 4,6 2,6 13,5 18,5 56,6 2,9 5,0 3,5 6,2 11,7 68,3 2,9 5,1 5,8
2007 46,0 17,1 26,0 2,9 6,0 2,1 33,5 21,2 34,7 2,8 5,5 2,2 18,4 22,1 48,5 2,9 5,4 2,7 12,2 20,0 56,5 2,9 5,5 2,9 6,3 11,8 66,6 3,3 6,4 5,7
2008 46,3 16,9 25,8 3,3 5,8 1,9 33,9 21,1 34,5 3,2 5,5 1,8 18,7 21,6 48,6 3,6 5,7 1,8 12,4 19,1 57,2 3,6 5,5 2,4 5,7 13,2 67,0 3,6 7,1 3,3
2009 46,0 16,9 26,0 3,6 5,4 2,1 34,6 20,8 34,1 3,6 4,9 1,9 19,5 22,5 47,1 3,7 4,9 2,3 12,7 20,1 54,6 4,2 5,4 3,1 7,3 14,7 64,4 4,2 5,4 4,0
2010 45,1 17,0 27,3 3,0 5,5 2,1 34,2 21,1 34,5 3,2 5,0 2,1 19,5 21,9 47,8 3,1 5,1 2,6 12,7 20,3 54,1 3,4 6,0 3,6 6,4 12,9 64,2 4,5 6,1 5,9
Table A6. Composition of income: income sources. Colombia 2006-2010
Notes: The table reads as follows. In 2006, the income of the top 1% group (100%) can be decomposed into wages (29.7%), self-employment income (17.3%), rents and other capital income (42.2%), interest and other financial income (2.7%), business income (5%)
and irregular income (3.1%).
Top 1% Top 0.5%
Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001%
Top 0.1%
Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01% Top 0.01-0.001%
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2006 9,4 0,4 41,6 14,7 32,3 1,5 10,9 0,5 46,1 11,9 29,3 1,4 14,1 0,5 54,0 7,1 23,0 1,4
2007 9,1 0,5 42,9 13,9 32,3 1,3 10,4 0,6 47,5 11,1 29,3 1,2 13,2 0,8 55,3 6,9 22,8 1,1
2008 9,0 0,4 43,7 13,5 32,3 1,1 10,2 0,4 48,5 10,4 29,5 1,0 12,4 0,4 57,6 5,8 22,9 0,8
2009 8,9 0,4 42,3 14,3 32,8 1,3 10,2 0,4 46,7 11,3 30,2 1,2 12,6 0,5 55,2 6,4 24,1 1,2
2010 10,3 0,4 41,0 14,4 32,6 1,4 11,9 0,5 44,8 11,5 30,1 1,3 15,3 0,8 51,4 7,0 24,3 1,3
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2006 15,4 0,4 55,2 6,4 21,2 1,4 17,3 0,4 56,7 6,7 17,4 1,5 17,3 0,1 60,0 7,2 13,4 2,0
2007 14,3 0,9 56,3 6,5 21,0 1,0 16,1 1,4 56,7 7,4 17,5 1,0 16,3 2,9 58,2 8,8 13,3 0,4
2008 13,3 0,4 59,5 5,1 21,0 0,8 14,4 0,3 62,8 5,0 16,9 0,7 11,8 0,1 72,0 5,9 9,4 0,8
2009 13,6 0,5 56,8 5,6 22,2 1,3 14,9 0,5 59,2 5,1 18,7 1,6 12,8 0,1 68,2 5,2 11,1 2,6
2010 16,5 0,9 52,2 6,4 22,6 1,3 18,3 1,3 53,3 6,2 19,2 1,6 14,4 2,6 63,0 4,8 12,2 2,9
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2006 5,0 0,3 27,9 23,5 41,7 1,6 7,6 0,5 38,0 16,8 35,7 1,4 10,5 0,6 50,4 9,1 28,3 1,2 13,4 0,5 53,7 6,1 25,0 1,3 17,3 0,6 54,6 6,4 20,0 1,1
2007 5,1 0,3 29,0 22,6 41,3 1,6 7,6 0,4 39,5 15,2 35,9 1,4 9,8 0,5 52,3 8,1 28,0 1,3 12,4 0,4 55,9 5,6 24,7 1,0 15,9 0,3 55,6 6,4 20,4 1,4
2008 5,5 0,3 29,4 22,6 40,6 1,5 8,0 0,4 39,6 15,0 35,9 1,2 10,1 0,5 52,4 7,7 28,3 0,9 12,2 0,5 56,3 5,1 25,0 0,9 16,0 0,4 57,2 4,4 21,4 0,6
2009 5,3 0,3 29,6 23,0 40,1 1,6 8,0 0,3 39,0 15,7 35,8 1,2 10,2 0,4 51,1 8,4 28,9 1,0 12,4 0,5 54,6 6,0 25,4 1,1 16,1 0,6 54,2 5,1 22,9 1,0
2010 5,7 0,2 30,0 22,7 39,7 1,7 8,7 0,3 38,6 15,6 35,5 1,3 11,9 0,4 49,1 8,7 28,9 1,1 14,8 0,5 51,1 6,6 25,9 1,1 20,8 0,5 47,0 7,2 23,8 0,7
Table A7. Income composition of top groups: taxable and non-taxable income. Colombia 2006-2010
Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1%
Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income
Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001%
Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income
Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01% Top 0.01-0.001%
Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income
Notes: The table reads as follows. In 2006, the income of the top 1% group (100%) was divided into allowances ('ingresos no constitutivos de renta') (9.4%), deductions for investments in fixed assets (0.4%), costs and deductions (41.6%), exempt income (14.7%), 
regular taxable income (32.3%) and irregular taxable income (1.5%). We assume that 33% of income reported as 'ingresos no constitutivos de renta' come from taxed dividends, which are added to taxable regular income.
Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income Taxable income Non taxable income
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d+e a b c d e c+d+e
a+b+c+
d+e
2006 2,2 2,0 4,4 0,2 2,9 7,5 11,7 1,6 1,7 4,6 0,2 3,4 8,2 11,5 0,8 0,6 4,0 0,3 4,4 8,7 10,1
2007 2,1 2,1 4,7 0,1 2,3 7,2 11,5 1,7 1,6 4,8 0,2 2,7 7,7 11,0 0,9 0,5 4,1 0,2 3,4 7,7 9,1
2008 2,2 2,1 4,8 0,1 2,2 7,1 11,3 1,7 1,7 4,9 0,1 2,5 7,5 10,9 0,9 0,6 4,2 0,2 3,1 7,4 8,8
2009 2,3 2,0 4,8 0,1 2,2 7,1 11,4 1,7 1,8 5,0 0,2 2,5 7,6 11,1 0,9 0,6 4,4 0,2 3,1 7,7 9,3
2010 2,2 2,0 4,7 0,1 2,5 7,3 11,5 1,6 1,7 4,8 0,1 2,9 7,9 11,3 0,9 0,6 4,1 0,2 3,8 8,1 9,6
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2006 0,5 0,3 3,6 0,3 4,8 8,7 9,6 0,2 0,1 2,6 0,3 5,4 8,3 8,6 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,4 5,3 7,3 7,3
2007 0,6 0,3 3,7 0,2 3,7 7,6 8,5 0,2 0,1 2,8 0,2 4,2 7,2 7,5 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,1 4,3 5,9 6,0
2008 0,6 0,3 3,8 0,2 3,3 7,2 8,1 0,2 0,1 2,8 0,2 3,5 6,5 6,9 0,0 0,0 1,1 0,3 2,9 4,2 4,3
2009 0,6 0,4 4,0 0,2 3,3 7,6 8,6 0,2 0,2 3,2 0,2 3,7 7,1 7,5 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,2 3,1 4,8 4,9
2010 0,6 0,4 3,8 0,2 4,1 8,1 9,0 0,2 0,1 3,0 0,2 4,5 7,7 8,0 0,0 0,0 1,6 0,2 3,6 5,3 5,4
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d+e a b c d e c+d+e
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2006 3,9 2,8 3,9 0,1 1,6 5,6 12,3 2,4 2,8 5,2 0,1 2,4 7,7 13,0 1,7 1,2 5,1 0,2 3,3 8,5 11,4 0,9 0,6 4,6 0,3 4,2 9,1 10,6 0,3 0,2 3,3 0,3 5,4 9,0 9,5
2007 3,4 3,6 4,4 0,1 1,3 5,8 12,7 2,6 2,7 5,6 0,1 1,9 7,7 13,0 1,8 1,1 5,2 0,2 2,5 7,9 10,8 1,0 0,6 4,7 0,2 3,2 8,1 9,6 0,3 0,2 3,6 0,3 4,1 8,1 8,6
2008 3,6 3,2 4,4 0,1 1,4 5,8 12,6 2,5 2,7 5,6 0,1 2,0 7,7 12,9 1,7 1,1 5,2 0,1 2,5 7,9 10,7 0,9 0,6 4,7 0,2 3,0 7,9 9,4 0,3 0,2 3,9 0,1 3,9 7,9 8,4
2009 4,0 2,7 4,3 0,1 1,3 5,7 12,3 2,3 2,8 5,5 0,1 2,0 7,6 12,7 1,7 1,2 5,3 0,2 2,5 8,0 10,9 1,0 0,6 4,8 0,2 3,1 8,0 9,7 0,3 0,2 4,2 0,2 4,0 8,4 9,0
2010 3,9 2,7 4,3 0,1 1,4 5,7 12,3 2,3 2,8 5,5 0,1 2,1 7,7 12,8 1,6 1,2 5,1 0,1 2,9 8,2 11,0 1,0 0,6 4,6 0,2 3,7 8,4 10,1 0,3 0,2 3,9 0,2 5,1 9,2 9,7
Notes: Taxes on dividends assume the standard tax rate on dividends (witheld by companies) applied to 33% of " ingresos no constitutivos de renta ."
Table A8. Taxes and social security contributions paid by top groups. Average effective rates. Colombia 2006-2010
Top 0.1%
Top 0.01% Top 0.001%
Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01% Top 0.01-0.001%
Top 1% Top 0.5%
Top 0.05%
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0% 17% 25% 30%
1993 0 4.986.447 7.479.670 19.945.787
1994 0 6.087.454 9.131.181 24.349.817
1995 0 7.445.565 11.168.348 29.782.261
0% 20% 29% 35%
1996 0 8.992.754 13.489.131 35.971.015
1997 0 10.611.449 15.917.174 42.445.797
1998 0 12.309.281 18.463.922 49.237.125
1999 0 14.410.476 21.615.713 57.641.902
2000 0 15.759.296 23.638.944 63.037.184
2001 0 17.171.329 25.756.993 68.685.316
2002 0 18.558.772 27.838.159 74.235.089
0% 20% + 2% = 22% 29% + 2.9% = 31.9% 35% + 3.5% = 38.5%
2003 0 19.672.299 29.500.001 78.700.000
2004 0 20.400.001 32.400.001 78.000.001
2005 0 21.644.001 34.376.001 82.758.001
2006 0 22.742.001 36.119.001 86.954.001
0% 19% 28% 34%
2007 0 22.861.661 35.655.801 85.993.401
0% 19% 28% 33%
2008 0 24.038.861 37.491.801 90.421.401
2009 0 25.901.671 40.397.101 97.428.301
2010 0 26.764.951 41.743.501 100.675.501
Source: DIAN - SGAO - Estudios Económicos
Note: The table reads as follows. In 2010, taxable incomes in the range [0-26,764,951] face a marginal
tax rate of 0%; taxable incomes in the range [26,764,951-41,743,501] face a marginal tax rate of 19%;
and so on.
Table A9. Personal Income Tax Schedule: income brackets and rates
amounts in current Colombian Pesos
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Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01% Top 0.01-0.001%
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
A 18,53 14,06 7,21 5,40 2,79 1,15 4,47 6,85 1,81 2,62 1,64
B 19,26 14,51 7,37 5,49 2,77 1,11 4,75 7,14 1,88 2,72 1,66
C 19,24 14,58 7,47 5,59 2,88 1,19 4,66 7,11 1,87 2,71 1,69
D 19,94 15,01 7,62 5,67 2,86 1,15 4,93 7,38 1,95 2,81 1,72
Notes: Sample A consists of filers not required to keep accountancy books in the 1993-2006 micro-data. Sample B
consists of filers not required to keep accountancy books in the weighted 2006-2010 micro-data. Sample C is equal to
sample A, plus individuals required to keep accountancy books from the weighted 2006-2010 micro-data. Sample D is
equal to sample B, plus individuals required to keep accountancy books from the weighted 2006-2010 micro-data.
Source: Author's calculations using tax data.
Sample
Table A10. Robustness check of top income shares in 2006
a-preferred b c d e f g
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
2006 19,9 21,6 19,9 17,3 19,4 16,7 12,5
2007 20,5 22,3 20,4 17,9 20,0 17,0 12,6
2008 20,3 22,0 20,2 17,7 19,9 16,8 12,4
2009 20,2 21,9 20,1 17,6 19,7 16,8 12,6
2010 20,4 22,1 20,4 17,5 19,9 17,2 13,0
Notes:
Column c. Income is equal to (a) minus the deduction for investments in fixed assets.
Column d. Income is equal to (a) minus 'ingresos no constitutivos de renta.'
Column e. Income is equal to (a) but excluding net taxable and non taxable irregular income.
Table A11. Top 1% income share under different definitions of income. Colombia 2006-2010
Column g. Income is equal to (a) but excludes 'other costs and deductions' (tax form 210) and 'other deductions' (tax form 110) completely.
Column a. For individuals not obliged to keep accountancy books: income = taxable income, plus exempt income, plus deductions for investments in fixed assets, plus 5/6 of
'other costs and deductions' (tax form definition), plus other non-taxable income, plus net taxable and non taxable irregular income.
For individuals obliged to keep accountancy books: income = taxable income, plus exempt income, plus deductions for investment in fixed income, plus 5/6 of 'other
deductions' (tax form definition), plus other non-taxable income, plus net taxable and non taxable irregular income.
Income definition (a) assumes that one-sixth of 'other costs and deductions' (individuals not obliged to keep accountancy books) and 'other deductions' (individuals obliged to
keep accountancy books) are costs incurred to obtain income.
Column b. Income is equal to (a) but includes 'other costs and deductions' (tax form 210) and 'other deductions' (tax form 110) completely.
Column f. Income is equal to (a) plus 1/2 of 'other costs and deductions' (individuals not obliged to keep accountancy books) and 'other deductions' (individuals obliged to keep
accountancy books). Thus, income defintion (f) includes in total 1/2 of these costs and deductions.
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Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 0.001% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.05% Top 0.05-0.01%Top 0.01-0.001%
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
2006 28,1 30,0 32,7 33,2 32,8 34,7 24,5 28,5 31,7 32,8 33,8
2007 28,2 30,0 32,0 32,5 32,0 33,7 24,7 28,9 31,2 32,0 33,1
2008 27,9 29,6 31,3 31,7 31,4 32,6 24,7 28,7 30,7 31,4 32,3
2009 27,8 29,5 31,3 31,7 31,3 32,7 24,6 28,6 30,7 31,3 32,3
2010 27,9 29,5 31,3 31,7 31,3 32,8 24,6 28,6 30,6 31,3 32,3
Table A12. Weighted marginal tax rate of top groups, Colombia 2006-2010
Notes: The figures displays the histogram of taxable regular income. The data include the years 2007-2010. The statutory marginal
tax rate is displayed by the dashed line, and the kernel density of taxable regular income is plotted by the solid
line. The sample is restricted to filers not required to keep accountancy books. Taxable regular income has been converted
to CPI-adjusted "UVT" values. Bandwidth is 2 UVT in all estimations. In 2010, 2 UVT is equal to $49,100 pesos, or US$25.
Source: Author's calculations using tax data.
Panel A - Bunching at first kink Panel B - Bunching at top kink
FIGURE A1
Bunching at first and top kink in Colombia
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Source: Author's calculations using tax data.
FIGURE A2
Notes: The figure displays the histogram of taxable regular income. The data
include the years 2007-2010. The marginal tax rate schedule is displayed by the
dashed line, and the kernel density of taxable regular income is plotted by the
solid line. The sample is restricted to filers not required to keep accountancy
books. Taxable regular income has been converted to CPI-adjusted "UVT"
values. Bandwidth is 2 UVT in all estimations. In 2010, 2 UVT or $49,100 pesos,
around US$25.
Bunching: evidence by type of tax filer in Colombia
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FIGURE A3
Notes: Wage earner is defined as an individual whose wages represent at least
99 per cent of total gross income. Taxable regular income has been converted to
UVT. Bandwidth is 2 UVT in all estimations. In 2010, 2 UVTis $49,100 pesos, or
approximately USD 25.
Source: Author's calculations using tax data and Stata code used by Chetty et al.
(2011).
Wage earners: bunching at first kink, Colombia
FIGURE A4
Notes: Taxable regular income has been converted to UVT. Bandwidth is 2 UVT
in all estimations. In 2010, 2 UVT or $49,100 pesos, or approximately US$25.
Source: Author's calculations using tax data and Stata code used by Chetty et al.
(2011).
Bunching at the top kink, all types of taxpayers, Colombia
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